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COMMENTS
PRIVACY V. THE PRESS: INEVITABLE
CONFLICT?
Two rights which are basic to a free society are privacy' and
a free press. 2 There are times when these two basic freedoms
have come together in a head-on collision. For example, when
a national news story such as Watergate breaks, the press at-
tempts to cover it as thoroughly as possible. Investigative re-
porting can lead to the periphery of the event and stories are
printed about those who would desire to remain anonymous.
One who has been catapulted into the spotlight may attempt
to return to a "normal" life, but because of the relentlessness
of the press, this is impossible. Yet the relentlessness of the
press is acknowledged as having been a prime mover in bring-
ing about the end of the Nixon administration.
This article will examine the inadequacy of courts' analyses
of this conflict, in particular, the failure to examine the ration-
ale supporting freedom of the press and how this failure affects
a fair appraisal of the "right to privacy."
Since 1964 the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly
decided cases3 where plaintiffs have claimed an invasion of
privacy by the press. Time, Inc. v. Hill4 presented the situation
where a private citizen suddenly became a public figure and
despite all attempts to avoid publicity was repeatedly returned
to the public eye. In September, 1952, the James Hill family
was held hostage by three escaped convicts. They were released
unharmed, and in a subsequent interview Mr. Hill emphasized
that they had been treated courteously by the convicts. The
family did their best to avoid the public spotlight and moved
from Pennsylvania to Connecticut. In spite of this, a novel
which roughly paralleled their experience was published. The
1. In recognizing the right to privacy the Supreme. Court noted that such a right
was older than the Bill of Rights. Griswold v. Connecticut, 481 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928), Justice Brandeis' dissent
stated that the right of privacy is "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men."
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. The first of these cases was New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 272 (1964).
4. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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book was made into a play, and Life magazine which was pub-
lished by Time, Inc. printed a pictorial essay about the play.
The article led the reader to believe that the play was a re-
enactment of the Hill family's experience. Photographs por-
trayed the son being "roughed up" and the father's foiled at-
tempt to save his family. Hill brought his action under sections
50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law.' Although section
50 is entitled "Right of Privacy," the Court noted that "the
term nowhere appears in the text of the statute itself."6 The
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court had af-
firmed a jury verdict concerning the liability of Time, Inc.7
Thus the conflict was presented to the Supreme Court. Hill
asserted a statutory right of privacy, while Time, Inc. argued
that the statute denied it the constitutional protections of
speech and press.' The Court rejected Hill's argument and re-
5. The complete text of the N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1966) read
as follows:
§ 50. Right of privacy
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the
purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without
having first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or
her parent or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
§ 51. Action for injunction and for damages
Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within this state for
advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written consent
first obtained as above provided may maintain an equitable action in the su-
preme court of this state against the person, firm or corporation so using his
name, portrait or picture, to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may also
sue and recover damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such use and if
the defendant shall have knowingly used such person's name, portrait or picture
in such manner as is forbidden or declared to be unlawful by the last section,
the jury, in its discretion, may award exemplary damages. But nothing con-
tained in this act shall be so construed as to prevent any person, firm or corpora-
tion, practicing the profession of photography, from exhibiting in or about his
or its establishment specimens of the work of such establishment, unless the
same is continued by such person, firm or corporation after written notice ob-
jecting thereto has been given by the person portrayed, and nothing contained
in this act shall be so construed as to prevent any person, firm or corporation
from using the name, portrait or picture of any manufacturer or dealer in
connection with the goods, wares and merchandise manufactured, produced or
dealt in by him which he has sold or disposed of with such name, portrait or
picture used in connection therewith; or from using the name, protrait or picture
of any author, composer or artist in connection with his literary, musical or
artistic production which he has sold or disposed of with such name, portrait or
picture used in connection therewith.
6. 385 U.S. at 381.
7. Id. at 379.
8. Id. at 376.
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manded the case for further proceedings.
In arriving at this decision the Court relied on the standards
set out in the leading case of New York Times v. Sullivan
where the Court held that even when published material about
a public official contained false statements or was defamatory,
a cause of action for libel did not necessarily exist.10 The ration-
ale for such a rule was that "freedom of expression upon public
questions is secured by the First Amendment" and it "was
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social change . . . ."" The
Court then held that a public official could not recover dam-
ages for a defamatory falsehood relating to official conduct
unless "actual malice" could be proved. "Actual malice" was
defined as knowledge that the statement was false or made
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."
In Time, Inc. the Court held that the New York Appellate
Court was incorrect in holding that the New York Times "ac-
tual malice" test applied only when a public official was in-
volved'" and extended the New York Times test to matters of
public interest. 4 According to the Court, only if Hill could
prove that Life had published its report with knowledge of its
falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth did he have a cause
of action. 1 5
The Court examined this statutory "right to privacy" as it
had been interpreted by New York courts"6 and noted that
because of "constitutional protections for speech and press,
decisions under the statute have tended to limit the statute's
application."'' 7 The Court questioned the constitutional valid-
ity of a statute which created a cause of action against the press
9. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
10. Id. at 271.
11. Id. at 269. Quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
12. Id. at 279-80.
13. 385 U.S. at 387.
14. Id. at 387-88.
15. Id. at 388.
16. The law upon which Time, Inc. was based was enacted in 1903 as a response
to a court decision which held there was no common law right to privacy. The claim
in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902), was that
the defendants had adorned their flour bags with plaintiff's picture without her con-
sent. The court suggested that the legislature could provide that no one should be
permitted for his own selfish purpose to use the picture or name of another without
consent.
17. 385 U.S. at 382.
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for publication of names or pictures of people without their
consent. Therefore, the Court emphasized the fact that New
York courts had held that truth was a complete defense to
actions under the statute, 8 as it is for libel.
The New York Times case had applied the "actual malice"
standard to a public official. Time, Inc. extended it to a news-
worthy event. Shortly after the Time, Inc. decision, the Court
extended the New York Times standard to material published
about a public figure. 9 Finally, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia2
the Court stated:
It is clear that there has emerged from our cases decided since
New York Times the concept that the First Amendment's
impact upon state libel laws derives not so much from
whether the plaintiff is a "public official," "public figure," or
"private individual," as it derives from the question whether
the allegedly defamatory publication concerns a matter of
public or general interest.2'
After Rosenbloom, it seemed that there was nothing that the
press could cover which would not fall into one of the above
classifications. In fact, one wonders whether the press reports
what is newsworthy or whether that which the press reports
becomes newsworthy. If the latter is true, then the "actual
malice" standard applies to anything the press chooses to re-
port.
The Time, Inc. Court traced the claim of a "right to pri-
vacy" to the celebrated article of Warren and Brandeis,
entitled The Right to Privacy, published in 1890.22 Therein
privacy was simply defined as the "right of the individual to
be let alone."23 In discussing this "right to privacy" the Court,
quoting an eminent constitutional scholar, stated that "it has
been agreed that there is a generous privilege to serve the pub-
lic interest in news. ... 4 The Court deemphasized the right
to privacy and concentrated on the right of the press to report
the news without considering whether both rights could be pro-
18. Id. at 384.
19. Curtis Publishing v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1967).
20. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
21. Id. at 44.
22. 385 U.S. at 381.
23. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 205 (1890).
24. 385 U.S. at 383, n. 7 quoting Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and
Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 326, 335-36 (1966).
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tected. The Court observed that "[e]xposure of the self to
others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized
community," and refused to tolerate even the slightest inva-
sion of the right of free press. The Court noted that if freedoms
of expression are to survive they must have "breathing
space. '2 Finally, quoting James Madison, the Court stated:
"Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of
every thing; and in no instance is this more true than in that
of the press. 2 Consistent with the belief that the First Amend-
ment is an absolute, Justices Black and Douglas in their con-
curring opinions emphasized that the decision did not go far
enough in affording First Amendment freedoms proper protec-
tion.21
During the same period that the Court extended constitu-
tional protection to all discussion involving matters of public
or general concern, even if the discussion centered around a
private citizen involuntarily thrown into the public eye and
even if the publication was false,' it evolved the constitutional
"right to privacy."3 In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court
stated that "the First Amendment has a penumbra where pri-
vacy is protected from governmental intrusion"3 and that this
penumbra First Amendment right could be found in the Third,
Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments. 2
In Katz v. United States 3 the Court held that an individual
seeking privacy, even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected; hence one who occupies a tele-
phone booth considers his words private and the Constitution
affords this protection. 4 Nevertheless, the Court did not trans-
late the Fourth Amendment into a general constitutional
"right to privacy." The Court emphasized that "the protection
25. 385 U.S. at 388.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 388-89, quoting 4 ELuoT's DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONsTrrUTION 571
(1876 ed.).
28. Id. at 398-411. Accord, Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 170 (1967)
(Black, concurring and dissenting). See also Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an
Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. RFv. 245.
29. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 152 (1967).
30. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
31. Id. at 483.
32. Id. at 484. The Court also cited numerous past decisions which had recognized
a right to privacy. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
33. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
34. Id. at 352.
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of a person's general right to privacy-his right to be let alone
by other people-is.., left largely to the... States. 35 What
these decisions make clear is that although a constitutional
right to privacy exists, it protects the individual from govern-
mental, rather than private invasions of this right. Privacy,
which is recognized as a constitutionally protected fundamen-
tal freedom when the government is the invader, has been rele-
gated to a second-rate right when the press is the invader.
Just when it seemed clear that the Court would allow publi-
cation of anything about a public figure or a newsworthy event
which was not published with "actual malice," Gertz v.
Welch, 3 appeared. In that case, a Chicago policeman shot and
killed a youth. The family of the youth retained Gertz, an
attorney, to represent them in civil litigation against the po-
liceman. Although Gertz had only a remote involvement in the
prosecution of the policeman, he was attacked as the architect
of the police officer's "frameup" by Robert Welch, Inc., which
publishes the John Birch Society magazine.3 7 The article also
labeled Gertz a "Leninist" and "Communist fronter."
The Supreme Court reversed the trial and appellate courts'
decisions that the New York Times rule applied to these facts. 8
The Court repudiated its extension of the New York Times
standard to issues of "general or public interest" regardless of
whether the individual was a public figure or an anonymous
citizen" for the following reasons: First, public officials have a
better opportunity to repudiate false statements. Secondly, one
who involves himself in public life must accept certain neces-
sary consequences, one of which is that the public is concerned
with anything that might touch on fitness for office. Finally,
the media is entitled to assume that public figures and officials
have voluntarily exposed themselves to defamatory false-
hoods.40
The Gertz Court emphasized that strict liability for defam-
atory statements was not permissible and held that where the
defamatory statement "makes substantial danger to reputa-
35. Id. at 350-51.
36. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
37. Id. at 326.
38. Id. at 332.
39. Id. at 346-47.
40. Id. at 344-45.
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tion apparent" liability could be imposed." It stated that the
inquiry would be different if the statement did not make the
substantial danger apparent and cited Time, Inc. as an exam-
ple of a situation where the published material may not have
made substantial danger to reputation apparent.42 The ques-
tion in Time, Inc., however, was not whether the published
material made substantial danger to reputation apparent, but
rather whether actual malice was present. It would seem that
a plaintiff would have a better chance of proving that publica-
tion made substantial danger to reputation apparent than of
proving "actual malice." The reasoning of Gertz raises the
question of whether a Time, Inc. case would be decided today
differently than it was in 1967 by applying the "substantial
danger" rather than "actual malice" standard.43
Commonwealth v. Wiseman" does not fall within the ambit
of the libel and slander cases, but rather is based on an invasion
of the right to privacy. The controversy centered around the
showing of a documentary filmed at the Massachusetts Correc-
tional Institute for insane criminals. The filmmaker had ob-
tained prior permission from the Superintendent of Institu-
tions to make the film, but when the Superintendent saw the
finished product he objected on the grounds that the film "con-
stituted an invasion of the privacy of the inmates shown in the
film."45 The trial and appellate courts agreed.
The Commonwealth has standing and a duty to protect rea-
sonably, and in a manner consistent with other public inter-
ests, the inmates from any invasions of their privacy substan-
tially greater than those inevitably arising from the very fact
of confinement."
41. Id. at 347-48. The "substantial damages to reputation" standard had been used
by Justice Harlan in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) but the
plurality had not accepted this standard.
42. Id. at 348.
43. In Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974), the Court stated
that the District Judge had instructed that liability could be imposed only if the
statements printed in the newspaper were made with knowledge of their falsity or in
reckless disregard of the truth. Supra at 249-50. The Court went on to note that the
case did not present the issue of whether a state may constitutionally apply a more
relaxed standard of liability for publication of false statements under a "false light
theory of invasion of privacy." Supra at 250. Thus the Court has again opened up
another possibility of narrowing the application of the New York Times standard.
44. 356 Mass. 251, 249 N.E.2d 610 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970).
45. Id. at -, 249 N.E.2d at 613.
46. Id. at -, 249 N.E.2d at 615.
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The court held that while the film could not be shown to the
general public, it could be shown to legislators, doctors,
students and others dealing with social problems and custodial
care. " It also modified the trial court's order by allowing Mr.
Wiseman to alter the film for possible commercial distribution.
The court distinguished this case from cases such as Time,
Inc. on the ground that they permitted publication of newswor-
thy events where the public interest in reasonable dissemina-
tion of news was treated as more significant than the interest
of the individual to privacy. 8 The court did not deal with the
question of whether the conditions at the correctional institute
were a newsworthy event and therefore was not forced to bal-
ance the right to privacy with the media's First Amendment
right to present the film.
Although a "right to privacy" has been recognized as having
constitutional dimensions, it has not been viewed as a general
right and when it has collided with the freedom of the press,
the press has prevailed. As a result of such a resolution of the
conflict, a number of problems have not been adequately ad-
dressed. The first stems from the Court's comparison of libel
and slander cases to the invasion of privacy cases.49 Truth is a
defense in the former, but there appears to be no reason why
that should be the case in the latter. Application of the New
York Times standard totally disregards the fact that truth is
often more offensive than defamatory statements." A lawyer
examining New York Times and its progeny would find nothing
to help the client who has been catapulted into the public eye
with the concomitant result of publication of long dormant,
true information. The published material may or may not have
anything to do with the event which threw the individual into
the spotlight but is titilating and therefore, for some reason,
publishable. For example, does the trial of Patricia Hearst
entitle the press to publish any material it feels may interest
the public? Or does the fact that Lynnette Fromme attempted
to assassinate the President mean that a national newsmaga-
zine has a right, guaranteed by the First Amendment, to pub-
47. Id. at -, 249 N.E.2d at 618.
48. Id. at . 249 N.E.2d at 617.
49. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 384, n. 9 (1967). See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF.
L. REV. 383 (1960).
50. Lusky, Invasion of Privacy: A Classification of Concepts, 72 COLUM. L. REV.
693, 697 (1972).
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lish photos of Ms. Fromme in the nude?51
The second problem is that even when the case is a libel
case, the Court has failed to analyze the rationale of the free-
dom of the press. Or where the Court has attempted analysis,
it has failed to specifically address whether the New York
Times standard should be applied when an invasion of privacy
is claimed. The rationale for freedom of the press is based, in
part, on a belief that a free press facilitates the search for truth
and concomitantly, is a means of securing governmental hon-
esty.52 In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, the Court stated:
The guarantees of freedom of speech and press were not de-
signed to prevent the censorship of the press merely, but any
action of the government by means of which it might prevent
such free and general discussion of public matters as seem
absolutely essential . . .53
Yet the meaning of the right to a free press has not remained
the same throughout our Constitutional history and has meant
different things to different men sitting on the Court at the
same time. 4
One of the earliest of the precedent-setting free press
cases,55 People v. Croswell," provides one court's concept of the
meaning of the First Amendment and is of assistance to the
modern legalist in searching for the balance between privacy
51. Time, Sept. 15, 1975, at 11.
52. J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA, in THE TRADITION OF FREEDOM 1, 28 (Mayer ed. 1957);
See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J. concurring) (holding
overruled); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), wherein it was stated that the
First Amendment freedoms were an institutionalization of the belief "that the final
end of the state was to make men free to develop their faculties . . . ." The founders
"believed that freedom to think as you will and speak as you think are means indispen-
sable to the discovery and spread of political truth." See also Hastie, Free Speech:
Contrasting Constitutional Concepts and their Consequences, 9 HARV. CIV.
RIGHTs-Civ. LIm. L. REV. 428, 432 (1974). But see Duval, Free Communication of
Ideas and the Quest for Truth: Toward a Teleological Approach to First Amendment
Adjudication, 41 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 161, 190 (1972).
53. 388 U.S. at 150.
54. The First Amendment has not always limited the government so that it could
make "no law ... abridging the freedom of... the press." See e.g., the Sedition Act,
1 STAT. 596 (1798). In addition, opinions on how the amendment should be applied
differ. Compare New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (Justice Brennan
writing for the court) with the concurring opinion of Justice Black in that same case.
Id. at 293.
55. Justice Jackson dissenting in Beauharnois v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 295 (1952),
described Croswell as "the leading state case."
56. 3 Johns. Cas. 337 (1804), reprinted in 1 N.Y. Common Law Rep. 717.
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and press. Croswell had been convicted of libel for printing an
editorial that accused Thomas Jefferson of paying another to
call "Washington .. . a traitor, a robber, and a perjurer
... ,, The question on appeal was whether truth was a de-
fense, and the court found that it was." The court stated that
liberty of the press "consists in the right to publish, with im-
punity, truth, with good motives, and for justifiable ends,
whether it respects government, magistracy or individuals." 9
A government which allows a free press is fulfilling the obliga-
tion which Madison described in the Federalist No. 51, as the
obligation "to control itself." This decision, which has been
viewed as a great victory for the press,6" recognized some limi-
tations on a free press.
The Croswell court viewed the protection to be accorded
the press in terms of the need for a free press. A return to the
concept of publishing "truth, with good motives, and for justifi-
able ends" may be impossible because of the difficulty of defin-
ing "good motives" or "justifiable ends." Yet this very stan-
dard, coupled with the reasoning of the New York Times case
and its companion, Garrison v. Louisiana,"1 could protect the
right to a free press and the private citizen from having his
privacy invaded in the name of the First Amendment. Justice
Brennan stated that "speech concerning public affairs is more
than self expression; it is the essence of self government...
[and therefore] should be uninhibited robust and wide
open." Thus the New York Times standard should operate
when the material published concerned "public affairs," but a
more stringent standard should apply when the material con-
cerned a private citizen. The standard would require not only
that the published matter be true but that it pertain to events
which threw the individual into the public eye and that it
satisfy some public need for the published material. But if the
published material appears on a public record, there can be no
claim of invasion of privacy.63 Similarly no claim of privacy
should be made when consent to publish has been obtained. 4
57. 3 Johns. Cas. at 338, 1 N.Y. Common Law Rep. at 717.
58. Id. at 394, 1 N.Y. Common Law Rep. at 735
59. Id. at 393-94, 1 N.Y. Common Law Rep. at 735.
60. Forkosch, Freedom of the Press: Croswell's Case, 33 FORD. L. REV. 415 (1965).
61. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
62. Id. at 74.
63. Cox Broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
64. Beytagh, Privacy and a Free Press, 20 N.Y.L.F. 453, 498 (1975). See also Neff
v. Time, Inc., 44 L.W. 2373 (1976).
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Consent could be either express or implied as, for example,
where one had consented to publication of a photograph by
one's posing for it.
Of course, such a standard would draw courts into the mo-
rass of determining what is and is not relevant and necessary.
But, the standard is not invalid merely because a difficult
question is presented or because the solution is just as difficult.
The individual does have a constitutionally protected right to
privacy. Respecting this right when the government invades,
while refusing to do so when the press invades is illogical. The
right exists, therefore courts must attempt to protect it and
must cease evading the issue with statements such as
"[e]xposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a con-
comitant of life in a civilized community."6 Whose idea of a
"civilized community"? Reasonable restrictions upon the exer-
cise of First Amendment rights are permissible." The Court
has held that laws which regulate conduct within the power of
the state or federal government but do not directly infringe
upon First Amendment rights can be upheld if the effect on
these rights is minor in relation to the need for controlling the
conduct."
Therefore, this author suggests that the right to privacy
cannot be ignored where it conflicts with the right to a free
press. Society's need for a free press must be balanced with the
individual's right to privacy. It is extremely difficult for pub-
lishers and the courts to determine what is "relevant" or
"necessary," but the attempt must be made in order to protect
the individual. To say that the determination of what is or is
not relevant is too fine a line to draw ignores the fact that
courts make just as difficult decisions every day. When faced
with a free press issue, courts should look beyond the language
of the New York Times case and conform their decisions to the
rationale of the right to a free press. In so doing, the free press
shall be protected; matters of public concern will be published
without threat of liability; and undue invasion of the individ-
ual's right to privacy will cease.
GREGORY M. WEYANDT
65. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967). See Warren and Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
66. E.g., Citizens Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
67. E.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 269 (1940); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415 (1963).
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